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Abstract
Recently, evidence has emerged that humans approach learning using Bayesian updating rather than (model-free)
reinforcement algorithms in a six-arm restless bandit problem. Here, we investigate what this implies for human
appreciation of uncertainty. In our task, a Bayesian learner distinguishes three equally salient levels of uncertainty. First, the
Bayesian perceives irreducible uncertainty or risk: even knowing the payoff probabilities of a given arm, the outcome
remains uncertain. Second, there is (parameter) estimation uncertainty or ambiguity: payoff probabilities are unknown and
need to be estimated. Third, the outcome probabilities of the arms change: the sudden jumps are referred to as unexpected
uncertainty. We document how the three levels of uncertainty evolved during the course of our experiment and how it
affected the learning rate. We then zoom in on estimation uncertainty, which has been suggested to be a driving force in
exploration, in spite of evidence of widespread aversion to ambiguity. Our data corroborate the latter. We discuss neural
evidence that foreshadowed the ability of humans to distinguish between the three levels of uncertainty. Finally, we
investigate the boundaries of human capacity to implement Bayesian learning. We repeat the experiment with different
instructions, reflecting varying levels of structural uncertainty. Under this fourth notion of uncertainty, choices were no
better explained by Bayesian updating than by (model-free) reinforcement learning. Exit questionnaires revealed that
participants remained unaware of the presence of unexpected uncertainty and failed to acquire the right model with which
to implement Bayesian updating.
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Introduction
In an environment where reward targets and loss sources are
stochastic, and subject to sudden, discrete changes, the key
problem humans face is learning. At a minimum, they need to be
able to assess estimation uncertainty [1–4], i.e., the extent to which
learning still has to be completed. High levels of estimation
uncertainty call for more learning, while low levels of estimation
uncertainty would suggest slower learning.
To correctly gauge estimation uncertainty, two additional
statistical properties of the environment ought to be evaluated: risk,
or how much irreducible uncertainty would be left even after the best
of learning; and unexpected uncertainty, or how likely it is that the
environment suddenly changes [5]. The notion of risk captures the
idea that, to a certain extent, forecast errors are expected, and
therefore should not affect learning. Under unexpected uncertainty,
these same forecast errors are indications that learning may have to
be re-started becauseoutcome contingencies have changed discretely.
With Bayesian learning, the three notions of uncertainty are
tracked explicitly. This is because Bayesians form a model of the
environment that delineates the boundaries of risk, estimation
uncertainty and unexpected uncertainty. The delineation is
crucial: estimation uncertainty tells Bayesians how much still
needs to be learned, while unexpected uncertainty leads them to
forget part of what they learned in the past.
This contrasts with model-free reinforcement learning. There,
uncertainty is monolithic: it is the expected magnitude of the
prediction error [6]. Under reinforcement learning, only the value
of a chosen option is updated, on the basis of the reward (or loss)
prediction error, i.e., the difference between the received and the
anticipated reward (or loss) [7]. No attempt is made to disentangle
the different sources of the prediction error. Usually, the learning
rate is kept constant. If not, as in the Pearce-Hall algorithm [8],
adjustment is based on the total size of the prediction error.
Recently, evidence has emerged that, in environments where
risk, estimation uncertainty and unexpected uncertainty all vary
simultaneously, humans choose as if they were Bayesians [9].
Formally, the experiment that generated this evidence involved a
six-arm restless bandit problem. Participants were asked to choose
among six options with different risk profiles and differing
frequencies of changes in reward (and loss) probabilities. Assuming
softmax exploration [10], the Bayesian updating model was shown
to provide a significantly improved fit over standard reinforcement
learning as well as the Pearce-Hall extension.
To discover that humans are Bayesians implies that they must have
tracked the three levels of uncertainty. Here, we discuss how the levels
differentially affected the Bayesian learning rate in our restless bandit
task, and how participants could have distinguished between them.
Neural implementation of Bayesian learning would require
separate encoding of the three levels of uncertainty. Recent human
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evidence has only been suggestive, however, as no imaging study
to date involved independent control of risk, estimation uncer-
tainty and unexpected uncertainty.
Indeed, to our knowledge, ours is the first comprehensive study
of risk, estimation uncertainty, and unexpected uncertainty. Many
studies have focused on risk [11–13]. Estimation uncertainty has
been investigated widely in the economics literature, where it is
referred to as ambiguity [14], and a few imaging studies have
explored its neurobiological basis [3,15,16]. Unexpected uncer-
tainty has only rarely been considered [4,5]. [4] is closest to our
study in that it was the first to document that humans correctly
adjust their learning rates to changes in the average level of
unexpected uncertainty (referred to in [4] as volatility).
The task in [4] involved a bandit with only two arms, however.
For our purposes, this entails a number of disadvantages. First, it is
impossible to independently track the three levels of uncertainty
with only two arms; at a minimum, six arms are needed, and this is
what is implemented in the experiment here. As a matter of fact, in
[4], risk was decreased along with unexpected uncertainty,
introducing a confound that masked the full effect of unexpected
uncertainty on the learning rate. Second, the two arms in [4] have
perfectly negatively correlated reward probabilities, and as such,
the task is one of reversal learning [17]. This means that outcomes
for one arm are fully informative for the other one. Consequently,
exploration is of no consequence.
This is important because, here, we are interested in re-visiting
the data in [9] and investigate exploration. One of the notions of
uncertainty, namely, estimation uncertainty, is not only an
important determinant of the learning rate. It has been
conjectured to be a key driving force behind exploration.
Specifically, some have proposed that an ‘‘exploration bonus’’ be
added to the value of an option, and that this exploration bonus be
increased with the need to learn, i.e., with estimation uncertainty
[1,10,18].
In our six-arm restless bandit problem, estimation uncertainty
varied substantially over time and across arms, thus providing
power to detect the presence of an exploration bonus in valuation,
and hence, an effect of estimation uncertainty on exploration.
Before our study, behavioral evidence in favor of an exploration
bonus had been weak: [10] showed that human exploration can be
modeled using softmax, but found no reliable evidence of an
exploration bonus. But in their (four-armed) bandit problem,
estimation uncertainty varied little across bandits, unlike in ours.
Firing of dopaminergic neurons in response to novel, uncertain
stimuli has been interpreted as signaling exploration value [18];
yet, it can be questioned whether estimation uncertainty ought to
enter valuation through a bonus. Findings in economics, starting
with [19], would make one believe otherwise. There, evidence
abounds that humans are averse to estimation uncertainty – there
called ambiguity. Ambiguity aversion often leads to fundamental
inconsistencies in choices, as exemplified by the Ellsberg Paradox
[14]. If anything, this suggests that estimation uncertainty enters
valuation through a penalty.
We re-visited the choices generated by the restless six-arm
bandit problem of [9] and investigated whether estimation
uncertainty changed valuation positively (exploration bonus) or
negatively (ambiguity penalty).
Finally, we studied to what extent the empirical support for
Bayesian learning depended on the level of detail participants
received regarding the outcome generating process. In [9],
participants were fully informed about the structure of the bandit
problem (risks could be different across bandits; probabilities
jumped with differing frequency across bandits; and jumps
occurred simultaneously for a number of bandits). They were
ignorant only about the values of the parameters (outcome
probabilities, jump frequencies, occurrence of jumps). As such,
there was no ‘‘structural uncertainty’’ (or Knightian uncertainty as it
is known in economics; [20–24]). In contrast, in [4], participants
were naive about the task structure, so there was substantial
structural uncertainty. There, participant choices reflected adjust-
ment of learning rates to average unexpected uncertainty, suggesting
that they had learned some aspects of the outcome generating
process.
Here, we report new results that clarify to what extent trial-by-
trial choices reflected Bayesian updating under structural uncer-
tainty. We re-ran the six-arm restless bandit experiment, but we
varied the amount of structural uncertainty. In one treatment, we
told participants nothing about the outcome generating process. In
another treatment, we informed the participants about everything
except unexpected uncertainty. The third treatment was a
replication of [9], to calibrate the findings.
Results
Formal Analysis of the Task
Our task was a six-arm restless bandit problem, visually
presented as a board game (see Fig. 1A). Arms were color-coded:
the outcome probabilities for the red arms jumped more
frequently. At each trial, arms paid one of three possible rewards:
1, 0 and 21 Swiss francs (CHF) for the blue arms, and 2, 0, 22
CHF for the red arms. Outcome probabilities were unknown.
Outcome probabilities within a color group jumped simulta-
neously. Participants did not know the jump frequencies. Nor did
they know when jumps occurred. As such, there was unexpected
uncertainty. After a jump, the outcome probabilities are given
new, unknown values. Specifically, they did not revert to old values
as in reversal learning tasks (e.g., [17]), and hence, there is
estimation uncertainty throughout the duration of the task.
In the version of this task in [9], participants were fully informed
about the structure of the outcome generating process. They
merely had to learn (and, after each perceived jump, re-learn) the
Author Summary
The ability of humans to learn changing reward contin-
gencies implies that they perceive, at a minimum, three
levels of uncertainty: risk, which reflects imperfect
foresight even after everything is learned; (parameter)
estimation uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about outcome
probabilities; and unexpected uncertainty, or sudden
changes in the probabilities. We describe how these levels
of uncertainty evolve in a natural sampling task in which
human choices reliably reflect optimal (Bayesian) learning,
and how their evolution changes the learning rate. We
then zoom in on estimation uncertainty. The ability to
sense estimation uncertainty (also known as ambiguity) is
a virtue because, besides allowing one to learn optimally, it
may guide more effective exploration; but aversion to
estimation uncertainty may be maladaptive. Here, we
show that participant choices reflected aversion to
estimation uncertainty. We discuss how past imaging
studies foreshadowed the ability of humans to distinguish
the different notions of uncertainty. Also, we document
that the ability of participants to do such distinction relies
on sufficient revelation of the payoff-generating model.
When we induced structural uncertainty, participants did
not gain awareness of the jumps in our task, and fell back
to model-free reinforcement learning.
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jump (or the occurrence of a jump). We replicated this base version
– to be referred to as Treatment 3 below. Additionally, we ran two
variations of this board game, where we reduced the amount of
structural information we gave the participants. We elaborate
below. The three variations represent varying levels of model or
structural uncertainty.
To analyze the results, we implemented a forgetting Bayesian
algorithm [25] based on multinomial sampling under the Dirichlet
prior with dynamic adjustment of the learning rate to evidence of
the presence of jumps. In [9], a hierarchical Bayesian scheme was
investigated as well. While qualitatively the same (and producing
indistinguishable behavioral fits), the forgetting algorithm produc-
es explicit learning rates, while in the hierarchical Bayesian approach,
learning rates are only implicit. The availability of explicit
formulae facilitated our analysis of the impact of the three levels
of uncertainty on the learning speed.
In each trial T, an option l generated either the fixed loss
outcome, denoted by r1, with probability pl1T, the null outcome
(r2), with probability pl2T, or the fixed reward outcome (r3), with
Figure 1. Six-arm restless bandit task. A The six-arm restless bandit is implemented graphically as a board game. Six locations correspond to the
six arms. Locations are color-coded; blue locations have lower average unexpected uncertainty than red locations. Blue locations pay 1, 0 or 21 CHF
(Swiss francs). Red locations pay 2, 0 or 22 CHF. Chosen option is highlighted (in this case, location 5). Participants can freely choose a location each
trial. Histories of outcomes in locations chosen in the past are shown by means of coin piles. B Visual representation of risk and estimation
uncertainty. Risk can be tracked using entropy, which depends on the relative magnitudes of the outcome probabilities, i.e., the relative heights of
the bars in the left chart. The bars represent the three estimated outcome probabilities (mean of the posterior probability distribution or PPD).
Entropy (risk) is maximal when the bars are all equal. Estimation uncertainty is represented by the widths of the posterior distributions of the
outcome probabilities, depicted in the right chart.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.g001
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dimensional simplex H; H~ pjpi§0, i~1...3,
P 3
i~1
pi~1
  
.
We start from the same prior distribution of outcome
probabilities for all options. It is denoted P0. We take it to be an
uninformative Dirichlet. At each trial T the Bayesian model
updates the distribution of outcome probabilities based on a
sufficient statistic that is constructed from the count vector
clT~(cliT,i~1...3), where cliT~drli(rliT). Here, drli denotes
point mass at ri. The forgetting algorithm takes the weighted
geometric mean between the usual Bayesian update of the
Dirichlet prior absent jumps and the original prior (for the case
a jump occurred). Weighting is based on the subjective likelihood
that no jump has occurred at trial T, l(T) – more on the nature of
l(T) below. For large T, the resulting posterior is Dirichlet, like
the prior. Specifically,
plT*Dir(^ p plT,nlT),
^ p pilT~
1
nlT
n0 ^ p pi0zNl
l(T)b cli cli(T)
  
, ð1Þ
nlT~n0zNl
l(T), ð2Þ
where
Nl
l(T)~
X
t[Dl(T)
P
T
s~t
l(s)
is the effective number of data used in the estimation of the
outcome probabilities. Here, Dl(T) is the set of trials before (and
including) trial T when option l was chosen. The sufficient statistic
b cli cli(T) is defined as:
b cli cli(T)~
P
t[Dl(T) P
T
s~t
l(s)
  
clit
Nl
l(T)
:
Significantly, this sufficient statistic can be obtained using simple
recursive computations. Specifically, if option l was chosen in trial
T,
b cli cli(T)~b cli cli(T{1) 1{gl(T) ðÞ zgl(T)cliT, ð3Þ
where gl(T), the learning rate, equals:
gl(T)~
1
1z l(T)
gl(T{1)
: ð4Þ
The other case (when option l was not chosen in trial T)i s
discussed in the Methods.
In Eqn 3, gl(T) controls the relative weight of the new observation
during learning. As such, it functions as the Bayesian learning rate.
This is fortunate. Usually, the learning speed in Bayesian updating is
only implicit; e.g., [4]. Because we have chosen to implement a
forgetting algorithm, the speed of learning becomes explicit, in the
form of a learning rate to be applied to the new observation.
The posterior mean outcome probabilities are computed as
follows:
  p pliT~
Nl
l(T)b cli cli(T)z1=3
Nl
l(T)z1
,i~1,...,3:
From these posterior means, the Bayesian decision maker
computes the expected value (payoff) of option l, Q(l,T).
To model adjudication between the six options, we opted for a
softmax rule. Specifically, in trial Tz1, option l is chosen with
probability
Pp(l,Tz1)~
exp bQ(l,T) ðÞ
P 6
l’~1
exp bQ(l’,T) ðÞ
: ð5Þ
Here, b (also referred to as inverse temperature) measures the
propensity to choose the option of currently greatest value rather
than the others. As such, b reflects the trade-off between the urge
to exploit, i.e., to choose the best option, and the interest in
exploring, i.e., to choose options currently deemed sub-optimal
with the goal of learning more about their values [26,27].
Evolution of Uncertainty and Effect on the Learning Rate
[9] documents that in the current task, learning strategies
behind human choices are better explained using Bayesian
updating than (model-free) reinforcement learning, even if the
learning rates in the latter are allowed to differ across choices with
differing jump probability, or allowed to change over time as a
function of the size of the reward prediction error. Crucial to
correct setting of the Bayesian learning rate in our task is the
ability to track three levels of uncertainty: risk, parameter
estimation uncertainty, and unexpected uncertainty. The Bayesian
model tracks these three levels independently, and they jointly
affect the learning rate. We first illustrate their evolution, and then
elaborate on how they modulate the learning rate.
Risk can be measured by the entropy of the outcome
probabilities. Since outcome probabilities are unknown through-
out our experiment, entropy needs to be estimated. We compute
entropy based on the posterior mean of the outcome probabilities.
See Fig. 1B for a graphical representation (left panel). Estimation
uncertainty, on the other hand, reflects the spread of the posterior
distribution of outcome probabilities. One could estimate it as the
variance of the posterior distribution, or its entropy. See Methods
for more information. Estimation uncertainty is depicted graph-
ically in Fig. 1B (right panel). Unexpected uncertainty is the
likelihood that outcome probabilities jump. Unexpected uncer-
tainty changes over time, as evidence for jumps fluctuates. Average
unexpected uncertainty differs also across options: blue locations
on our board game have lower chance of jumping; red locations
exhibit higher jump probabilities.
Fig. 2A displays the evolution of estimation uncertainty in one
instance of the task, based on choices of one participant.
Estimation uncertainty is measured here at each trial as entropy
of the posterior distribution of outcome probabilities. Estimation
uncertainty is shown only for the chosen option. Blue dots indicate
that an option was chosen with low average unexpected
uncertainty (a blue location); red dots indicate choices of options
with high average unexpected uncertainty (red locations).
Estimation uncertainty increases each time the participant
switches locations. The participant either switches to another
location with the same color code (same average unexpected
uncertainty) or to a location with a different color code.
Fig. 2B displays the evolution of the probability that no jump
occurred in the first 200 trials of another instance. High levels
Learning In Restless Bandits
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detection of a jump, and hence, high unexpected uncertainty. Blue
dots indicate trials when the chosen option was blue (low average
unexpected uncertainty) and a jump in blue locations occurred
simultaneously. Red dots indicate trials when the chosen option
was red and a jump occurred (for the red options). At times, the
participant seemed to have falsely detected a jump (e.g., in trial
54); but generally, the participant’s belief that a jump has occurred
correlates with actual occurrence of jumps.
The presence of unexpected uncertainty and the recurring
parameter estimation uncertainty make it more difficult to
correctly assess risk. Fig. 2C shows the mean level of risk assessed
in one instance of the task. Bayesian updating is assumed. Shown
are the average outcome entropies of each of the six options based
on posterior mean probabilities. Options are numbered 1 through
6. For comparison, we also display the true outcome entropies.
Results are stratified by level of average unexpected uncertainty:
blue options had lower probability of jumps in outcome
probabilities, while red options had high jump probabilities. The
presence of high unexpected uncertainty affects learning of risk
levels. On average, correct assignment of risk obtains for blue
locations. But it is more difficult to correctly assess the risk of red
locations.
The latter illustrates the antagonistic relationship [5] between the
perceptions of unexpected uncertainty and risk. If the former is
high, the latter is harder to estimate. A legitimate concern is,
therefore, whether these two sources of uncertainty can be
separately identified if participants are not told about their
presence. We will elaborate below.
The different levels of uncertainty affect the learning rate in
complex ways. Inspection of Eqn. 4 shows that the learning rate
glT changes as a function of the ratio of the probability that no
jump has occurred and the past learning rate:
l(T)
gl(T{1)
:
If the evidence for unexpected uncertainty is very low, i.e., if a
jump is deemed unlikely, l(T) is close to 1, and hence, the
learning rate decreases as in the absence of jumps, reflecting
merely the decrease in estimation uncertainty. If, in contrast, the
evidence for jumps is high, i.e., l(T) is close to zero, then the
learning rate increases towards 1 irrespective of the past learning
rate. This increase reflects the likely presence of a jump, and
hence, the need to learn anew. That is, estimation uncertainty
increases and so should the learning rate.
This shows how unexpected uncertainty affects estimation
uncertainty, and hence, the learning rate. While not directly,
estimation uncertainty itself does affect the learning rate, through
its effect on unexpected uncertainty. This can be verified by
inspecting the formula for the probability that no jump occurred in
trial T:
l(T)~
1
1z
^ p pi 0(nlT{1z1)
nlT{1^ p pi lT{1z1
, ð6Þ
where ^ p pi 0 and ^ p pi lT{1 denote the estimated probability, initially
and in trial T respectively, of observing outcome i  (i ~1,2,3, for
loss, zero income, and gain, respectively) and where nlT{1
parameterizes the precision of the posterior distribution of outcome
probabilities, which depends on the effective number of data used in
estimating those outcome probabilities (see Eqn. 2). (See Methods
for the derivation.) Estimation uncertainty, or its inverse, precision
of the posterior distribution of outcome probabilities, therefore
influences the estimate of the likelihood that no jump has occurred,
and hence, unexpected uncertainty. In turn, unexpected uncertain-
ty determines changes in the learning rate.
An analogous result obtains for risk – here defined as the entropy
of the outcome probabilities. Intuitively, entropy is the variability in
the probabilities across possible outcomes. If all outcome probabil-
ities are the same, entropy is maximal. If one or more outcome
probabilities are extreme (high or low), then entropy will be low.
Eqn. 6 shows that unexpected uncertainty depends on outcome
probabilities. The intuition is simple: if a particular outcome is
estimated to occur with low probability, and that outcome does
realize, the likelihood that it occurred because there was a jump is
higher; conversely, if an outcome had high a priori probability, then
its occurrence is unlikely to be attributed to unexpected uncertainty.
Through its effect on unexpected uncertainty, estimated outcome
probabilities have an effect on the learning rate.
Consequently, while the three levels of uncertainty separately
influence the learning rate, unexpected uncertainty is pivotal. That
is, estimation uncertainty and risk impact the learning rate
through their effect on unexpected uncertainty. For instance, if the
probability of an outcome is estimated with low precision
(estimation uncertainty is high) or if it is estimated to be average
(around 1=3), revealing high risk, then the realization of this
outcome is unlikely to be attributed to a jump. The parameter
l(T) is therefore high, and the Bayesian learning rate glT reduces
as if one were in a jump-free world.
Fig. 3 displays the evolution of the learning rate for two options
in one instance of the task. Shown are the (logarithm of) the
learning rates of (i) an option with low risk and low average jump
probability (low average unexpected uncertainty) [top], (ii) an
option with low risk and high average jump probability [bottom].
The learning history is based on the actual choices of one of the
participants in the experiment. Crosses on the horizontal axis
indicate trials where the participant chose the option at hand.
One can easily discern the effect of a reduction in estimation
uncertainty on the learning rate. During episodes when the
participant chooses an option, she learns about the outcome
probabilities, which reduces estimation uncertainty, and hence, the
learning rate. This continues until she stops visiting the location at
hand, and consequently, the – now imaginary – learning rate
Figure 2. Three kinds of uncertainty in the task. A Evolution of the estimation uncertainty (entropy of mean posterior outcome probabilities) of
chosen options in one instance of the board game. Learning is based on choices of one participant in our experiment. Blue dots on the horizontal axis
indicate trials when a blue location was chosen; red dots indicate trials when a red location was visited. B Evolution of the unexpected uncertainty of
chosen options in one instance of the board game, measured (inversely) as the probability that no jump has occurred. Learning is based on choices of
one participant in our experiment. Blue dots on the horizontal axis indicate trials when outcome probabilities for the visited blue location jumped;
red dots indicate trials when outcome probabilities for the visited red location jumped. C Average estimated risk (entropy of outcome probabilities)
in one instance of the board game, by location (numbered 1 to 6). Learning is based on the choices of one participant in our experiment. Locations
are arranged by level of unexpected uncertainty (blue: low; red: high). Average estimated risks are compared with true risks. The participant managed
to distinguish risk differentials across blue locations, but not across red locations. Average estimated risks regress towards the grand mean because of
estimation uncertainty after each jump in outcome probabilities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.g002
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there are no outcomes to be used to update beliefs; belief updating
for the unchosen options evolve only because of what one learns
about the chosen options.)
Exploration Bonuses and Ambiguity Penalties
To implement Bayesian learning, the decision maker has, at a
minimum, to track estimation uncertainty. As such, the decision
maker senses that she does not know the parameters, and hence,
she is ambiguity sensitive.
In multi-armed bandit settings, exploration is valuable. Only by
trying out options will one be able to learn, thus reducing
estimation uncertainty. As such, there should be a bonus to
exploration of options with high ambiguity. This was recently
proposed [18,28]. Decision makers should therefore be ambiguity
seeking, which conflicts with claims that humans generally exhibit
ambiguity aversion [14,19].
Here, we re-visit behavior in our six-arm restless bandit task to
determine to what extent choices reflect the presence of an exploration
bonus or an ambiguity penalty, both equal to the level of estimation
uncertainty. To this end, we added to the expected value of each
option an exploration bonus, or alternatively, we subtracted an
ambiguity penalty – computational details are provided in Methods.
For each participant, we compared the maximum log-likelihood of the
model with exploration bonus to that of the base version of the
Bayesian model;likewise,we compared the log-likelihood ofthe model
with ambiguity penalty to that of the base model. The log-likelihood of
a model is defined by Eqn. 8 in Methods.
The model with exploration bonus fitted worse than the one
without any correction of valuations for estimation uncertainty. In
contrast, the model with ambiguity penalty generated a better
likelihood than did the base version of the Bayesian model for 90%
of the participants. The individual log-likelihoods are reported
graphically in Fig.S1 of the Supporting Information. Fig. 4
displays the mean negative log-likelihoods and the corresponding
sample standard deviations across the 62 subjects. A paired t-test
based on the difference between the log-likelihoods of the two
models (n~62) leads to reject the hypothesis that this difference is
null with a p-value equal to 0.
Structural Uncertainty
To investigate to what extent the evidence in favor of Bayesian
updating is related to our providing subjects with ample structural
knowledge of the outcome generating process, we ran a new
Figure 3. Evolution of the (logarithm of the) Bayesian learning rate for two options in one instance of the board game. Learning is
based on the choices of one participant in our experiment. Top option has low average unexpected uncertainty (low chance of jumps) and low risk
(one outcome probability was very high); bottom option has high average unexpected uncertainty and low risk. Crosses on the horizontal axis
indicate trials when the option was chosen.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.g003
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we provided subjects only with the rules of the game, and no
structural information. In the second treatment, subjects were given
some structural information (e.g., within a color group, one option
was ‘‘biased’’ in the sense that its entropy was lower, while another
option was close to random), but were left ignorant about the
presence of jumps in the outcome probabilities; which means they
were not informed about the potential of unexpected uncertainty.
The third treatment was a replication of the original setting in [9].
43 undergraduates from the same institution (Ecole Polytechni-
que Fe ´de ´rale Lausanne) participated in the first treatment; 32 (30)
of them participated in the second (third) treatment. (We presented
the three treatments as three separate experiments, whereby
participants in the first treatment were invited but not forced to
participate in the two others.)
To calibrate the results, we first compare the fits of the third
treatment to those of [9]. Like in [9], we compare the log-
likelihood of the base version of the Bayesian model to the one of a
Rescorla-Wagner rule in which the learning rates are allowed to
differ across choices with differing jump probability (henceforth,
the ‘‘reinforcement learning model’’), and also to the one of the
Pearce-Hall extension of reinforcement learning. Fig. 5 displays
the mean BIC across the 30 participants for each of the three
models – the BIC or Schwarz Criterion [29] of a model is the
negative log-likelihood corrected for differences in number of
parameters to be estimated. Corresponding sample standard
deviations are also reported. A paired t-test based on the difference
between the BICs of the Bayesian and reinforcement learning
models (n~30) leads to the conclusion that the Bayesian model
fitted better than the reinforcement learning model with a p-value
smaller than 0:001. Like in [9], the Pearce-Hall model fitted the
data worst. The finding that the model with ambiguity penalty
provided the best fit is also replicated. The distributions of the
individual log-likelihoods for all four models (the base version of
the Bayesian model, the version with ambiguity penalty, the
reinforcement learning model and the Pearce-Hall extension) are
available in the Supporting Information (see Fig.S2).
Having replicated the results with full disclosure of the structure
of the outcome generating process, we turn to the first treatment,
where subjects were not given any structural information. Fig. 6A
compares the mean BIC of the Bayesian model with ambiguity
penalty – which appeared to outperform the base Bayesian model
in all treatments – to the one of the reinforcement learning model.
Corresponding sample standard deviations are displayed as well.
The fit of the ambiguity averse Bayesian model now does not
improve any more upon simple reinforcement learning, according
to a paired t-test based on the difference between the BICs of the
two models (n~43, p~0:2). In the second treatment, the
reinforcement learning model marginally outperformed the
ambiguity averse Bayesian model: a paired t test (n~32) leads to
the conclusion that the reinforcement learning model fitted better
with a p-value equal to 0:01. See Fig. 6B. In both treatments, the
fit of the Pearce-Hall model was worst for the large majority of the
subjects, and we do not report it on Fig. 6A or Fig. 6B. The
distributions of the individual log-likelihoods of all models are
reported in the Supporting Information (see Fig.S3 and Fig.S4).
Common to both Treatments 1 and 2 is the absence of
information on the presence of unexpected uncertainty. The
findings suggest that participants were not able to recognize that
outcome probabilities jumped. To verify this conjecture, we
examined the answers to the debriefing questionnaire after the
experiment – participant answers are available upon request.
Pooling the first two treatments (with a total of 75 cases), only 8
participants detected the presence of instability (they realized that
for certain of the six arms, ‘‘dark periods’’ alternated with good ones
during the task). When asked whether it would be ‘‘equally difficult
to learn on the red locations and the blue ones,’’ many subjects
answered affirmatively, despite the fact that the probability of a
jump (in outcome probabilities) on the red locations was four times
higher. A typical case was that of a participant in the second
treatment who reported: ‘‘At some point I got several bad outcomes
but I tried to be rational and stay since it was the good one.’’ The
participantmis-attributedasequenceofbadoutcomestorisk,rather
than interpreting it as evidence for a regime shift.
These findings are significant. In no way did the instructions
attempt to mislead the participants. On the contrary, we stated
explicitly that subjects had to watch out for features of the outcome
generating process other than those spelled out in the instructions.
Figure 4. Goodness-of-fits of the Bayesian models, with (right) and without (left) penalty for ambiguity. Based on approximately 500
choices of 62 participants. Data are from [9]. Heights of bars indicate mean of the individual negative log-likelihood; line segments indicate standard
deviations.    : pv0:001;   : pv0:01;  : pv0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.g004
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experiment of [9]), responses on the debriefing questionnaire
indicated that participants managed to detect changes during the
task, and could often estimate quite accurately the relative jump
probabilities across location colors.
Discussion
Neural Evidence for Separate Encoding of Uncertainty
Levels
On occasion, humans have been shown to choose like Bayesian
decision makers. In a context where outcome contingencies
change constantly, this implies that humans should be able to
distinguish various types of uncertainty, from unexpected
uncertainty, over (parameter) estimation uncertainty, to risk. We
will argue here that there exists emerging neurobiological evidence
for separate encoding of these categories of uncertainty. As such,
key components for neural implementation of Bayesian learning
have become identified in the human brain.
Numerous studies have localized neural signals correlating with
risk. Some sub-cortical regions are also involved in tracking
expected reward (striatal regions; [30]) and the relatively crude
fMRI evidence is supported by single-unit recordings in the
monkey brain [31]; the evidence for neural signals of risk
independent of expected reward has been identified mostly in
cortical structures (anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex,
inferior frontal gyrus, and interparietal sulcus) [11,12,30,32–35].
Estimation uncertainty, or ambiguity as it is referred to in
economics, has also recently been investigated in imaging studies.
Early evidence pointed to involvement of the amygdala and lateral
orbitofrontal cortex [15]; subsequent parametric work has corrobo-
rated [12] and extended with activation of the frontopolar cortex [3].
Experimental paradigms where estimation uncertainty is manipulat-
ed as in the six-arm restless bandit problem have yet to be organized.
Involvement of locus coeruleus and the neurotransmitter
norepinephrine in tracking unexpected uncertainty has been
conjectured a number of times and the evidence in its favor is
suggestive [5,28,28], but further proof is needed. Unexpected
uncertainty will have to be manipulated parametrically, as
norepinephrine is known to be generally involved in attention
modulation as well as general exploratory behavior [36]. Without
parametric manipulation, activations can as well be interpreted as
reflecting attention or exploration.
Activation of the amygdala-hippocampus complex to novel
images in a learning context may be conjectured to reflect
unexpected uncertainty [37,38]. Neural correlates with the
Bayesian learning rate have been identified in the precuneus and
anterior cingulate cortex [4,39]. Because of the close relationship
between the Bayesian learning rate and unexpected uncertainty
(effects of risk and estimation uncertainty on the learning rate
operate through unexpected uncertainty, as explained before), these
neural signals could as well reflect unexpected uncertainty (changes
in the likelihood that outcome probabilities have jumped).
Bayesian Exploration
Evidence has thus emerged that the distinction of the three
forms of uncertainty exists at the neuronal level. The well-
documented sensitivity of humans to ambiguity (estimation
uncertainty) further proves that the distinction can readily be
observed in behavior. Confirming humans’ sensitivity to estima-
tion uncertainty, we presented evidence here that participants’
tendency to explore in a six-arm restless bandit task decreased with
estimation uncertainty. This finding falsifies the hypothesis that
estimation uncertainty ought to induce exploration. It is, however,
consistent with evidence of ambiguity aversion in the experimental
economics literature, starting with [14,19]. We are the first to show
the parametric relationship between estimation uncertainty and
exploration: the relationship is negative.
The reader may wonder why we have not augmented the
reinforcement learning model with an ambiguity penalty, and
examined the behavioral fit of this version of model-free
reinforcement learning. The point is that non-Bayesians do not
sense ambiguity. Indeed, the concept of a posterior belief is foreign
to non-Bayesian updating, and hence, the variance or entropy of
the posterior distribution of outcome probabilities, our two
measures of estimation uncertainty, are quintessentially Bayesian.
Since the representation of ambiguity is absent in the context of
model-free reinforcement learning, a fortiori ambiguity cannot
weigh in the exploration strategy. In light of this, one should not
combine model-free reinforcement learning with an ambiguity
penalty/bonus.
Figure 5. Replication of the experiment in [9]. Mean BICs and standard deviations of the Bayesian, reinforcement and Pearce-Hall learning
models without structural uncertainty (Treatment 3). Based on the choices of 30 participants in approximately 500 trials of our board game. The
Bayesian model is the base version (unadjusted for ambiguity aversion).    : pv0:001;   : pv0:01;  : pv0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.g005
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A third major finding was that full Bayesian updating is reflected
in human learning only if enough structural information of the
outcome generating process is provided. Specifically, the ability to
track unexpected uncertainty, and hence, to detect jumps in the
outcome probabilities, appeared to rely on instructions that such
jumps would occur. When participants were not informed about
the presence of unexpected uncertainty, their choices could
equally well be explained in terms of simple reinforcement
learning. This evidence emerged despite suggestions to watch for
features of the outcome generating process that were not made
explicit in the instructions.
Situations where decision makers are ignorant of the specifics of
the outcome generating process entail model or structural
uncertainty. Our study is the first to discover that humans cannot
necessarily resolve model uncertainty. In our experiment, many
participants failed to recognize the presence of unexpected
uncertainty. Consequently, in the exit questionnaires they often
took the arms to be ‘‘random’’ [in our language, risky] which
illustrates the antagonistic relationship between risk and unexpected
uncertainty – jumps were confounded with realization of risk.
Our participants’ failure to detect jumps may suggest that their
‘‘mental models’’ excluded nonstationarity a priori. Mental models
are expectancies or predispositions which serve to select and
organize the information coming from the environment [40,41].
Nudging [42] may be needed, whereby the instructions bring the
likely presence of jumps to the attention of the participants.
Structural uncertainty was originally suggested in the economics
literature, where it is referred to as Knightian or Keynesian
uncertainty [20,21]. Nevertheless, even in economics, structural
uncertainty is often treated interchangeably with estimation
uncertainty or ambiguity; e.g., [43]. In principle, structural
uncertainty can be dealt with by introducing extra parameters
that identify the possible models of the outcome generating
process. Structural uncertainty thereby collapses to simple
(parameter) estimation uncertainty.
Nevertheless, we think it is important to refrain from reducing
structural uncertainty to mere parameter estimation uncertainty,
because the number of possible models of the outcome generating
process in any given situation is large, and hence, the number of
parameters to be added to capture structural uncertainty can be
prohibitively high [24]. It is well known that Bayesian updating
will fail dramatically when the parameter space is high-
dimensional [44]; in such situations, model-free reinforcement
learning produces, in a simple and consistent way, the right
statistics to guide choice.
The latter may explain our finding that human choice in our six-
arm restless bandit task reveals less evidence of Bayesian updating
when we introduce structural uncertainty. Since reinforcement
learning provides ready guidance in situations where Bayesian
updating may fail, our participants understandably switched
learning strategies. Because theybecame(model-free) reinforcement
learners, they no longer detected unexpected uncertainty. Indeed,
uncertainty is monolithic in the absence of a model of the outcome
generating process; there is no distinction between risk, estimation
uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, or even model uncertainty.
To conclude, our results suggest that learning-wise, structural
uncertainty should not be thought of as an extension of ambiguity.
We thus advocate a separation of situations entailing structural
uncertainty and situations entailing ambiguity in future studies of
decision making under uncertainty. We would also advocate a
clear separation of situations where the outcome probabilities
change suddenly and the related but mathematically distinct
situations, where outcome probabilities change continuously. The
former entail unexpected uncertainty. The latter are analogous to
the contexts where Kalman filtering provides optimal forecasts,
but where risk is stochastic. In financial economics, one therefore
uses the term stochastic volatility [45]. Recently, computational
neuroscientists have underscored the need to distinguish between
unexpected uncertainty and stochastic volatility [46].
In our six-arm restless bandit, the three levels of uncertainty
change in equally salient ways. Future imaging studies could
therefore rely on our task to better localize the encoding of
uncertainty and its three components. In addition, our task could
allow one to investigate engagement of brain structures in the
determination of the learning rate.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All the experiments reported on here had the approval from the
ethics commission of the Ecole Polytechnique Fe ´de ´rale Lausanne.
The Task
Weimplemented a six-armrestlessbandittaskwithaboardgame.
See Fig. 1A. Participants played approximately 500 trials of this
game. We investigated learning behind participants’ choices from
two experiments. The data from the first experiment were originally
presented in [9]. In this experiment, participants were given precise
instructions about the structure of the outcome generating process.
That is, there was no structural uncertainty. In the second
experiment, we invited new participants to play our board game,
under oneof threetreatments.In Treatment 1,participantswerenot
told anything about the structure of the outcome generating process.
That is, there was full structural uncertainty. In Treatment 2,
participants were told everything about the outcome generating
process except the presence of jumps. Participants were warned that
the structural description was not complete, and were invited to pay
attention to possible structure beyond that revealed in the
instructions. Treatment 3 was a replication of the experiment in
[9] – as such, there was no structural uncertainty.
Bayesian Learning in the Task
In our Bayesian learning model, the distribution of outcome
probabilities is updated using Bayes’ law and a stabilized forgetting
[25] operator. At trial T, Bayes’ law transforms the given prior to
the posterior using the likelihood of the observed outcome and the
prior. The transformation depends on a sufficient statistic which is
Figure 6. Goodness-of-fits of the Bayesian and reinforcement learning models under varying levels of structural uncertainty. A
Goodness-of-fits of the Bayesian and reinforcement learning models under full structural uncertainty (Treatment 1). Based on the choices of 43
participants in approximately 500 trials of our board game. The Bayesian model includes a penalty for estimation uncertainty – like in the data from
[9], this model turned out to fit the data better than the base version of the Bayesian model. Heights of bars indicate mean of the individual Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC); line segments indicate standard deviations. The difference in the mean BIC is not significant (pw0:1). B Goodness-of-fits of
the Bayesian and reinforcement learning models under partial structural uncertainty (Treatment 2). Mean BICs and standard deviations of the
Bayesian and reinforcement learning models in Treatment 2. Based on the choices of 32 participants in approximately 500 trials of our board game.
The Bayesian model includes a penalty for estimation uncertainty. Participants knew the structure of the game except for the jumps in outcome
probabilities. They were told that the description of the structure was incomplete.    : pv0:001;   : pv0:01;  : pv0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.g006
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cliT~drli(rliT). Here, drli denotes the point mass at ri (i.e.,
drli(rliT)~1 if the outcome at location l in trial T equals rli, and 0
otherwise).
Sinceourtaskinvolvesmultinomialoutcomes,wechoseaDirichlet
prior to initiate learning. Without jumps, posterior distributions will
be Dirichlet as well. As initial (first-trial) prior, we take the
uninformative Dirichlet with center ^ p p0~(^ p pi)i~1,2,3~(1=3,1=3,1=3)
and precision n0~(n0,n0,n0) where n0~1. Formally, the Dirichlet
prior equals:
P0 p ðÞ ~
P3
i~1 C(n0^ p pi0)
C(n0)
   {1
P
3
i~1
pi
n0^ p pi0{1 ðÞ dH(p),
where p~(pi)i~1,2,3, C is the Gamma function (C(x)~(x{1)!)
and H denotes the three-dimensional simplex, i.e.,
H~ pjpi§0,i~1...3,
P 3
i~1
pi~1
  
.
Let PlT=T~Pl(pjclT) denote the posterior distribution absent
jumps. It is obtained from the prior in the usual way, by combining
the prior with the (multinomial) likelihood of the count vector clT.
The posterior is Dirichlet as well, like the prior.
In a stationary world, this would provide the optimal inference.
Because jumps may occur (outcome probabilities may change), we
augment the standard Bayesian updating using a forgetting
operator, which we denote FT.
FT combines two distributions to generate a new posterior,
PlTz1=T. These two distributions are the following.
N After a jump in trial T, the posterior should no longer be
PlT=T, but another reference probability distribution. Here,
we use P0, the initial prior.
N In the absence of a jump, the decision maker should use the
standard Bayesian posterior, here denoted PlT=T.
Therefore, in principle, the new posterior should either be
PlT=T, when there is no jump, or P0, when there is one. But the
decision maker does not observe jumps directly, and hence, has to
weight the two cases based on the evidence for a jump. Our
forgetting operator thus mixes the two possibilities:
PlTz1=T~FT(PlT=T,P0):
From minimization of a Bayes risk criterion, FT has to be taken
to be a weighted geometric mean (see [9]). That is, PlTz1=T is the
(weighted) geometric mean of P0 and PlT=T. The weight depends
on the estimate of the likelihood that a jump has not occurred,
l(T). (Note that l(T) depends on the color of the location only, as
all options within a same color category jump simultaneously.) The
complement of l(T), 1{l(T), is a measure of jump likelihood,
and hence, unexpected uncertainty.
Consequently, the forgetting operator equals:
PlTz1=T~FT(PlT=T,P0)~ PlT=T
   l(T) P0 ðÞ
1{l(T):
The geometric mean is a tractable way to introduce information
on unexpected uncertainty in the updating because, for large T,
the posterior probability distribution is well approximated by a
Dirichlet distribution, so that updates remain in the same family of
distributions as the priors, namely, the family of Dirichlet priors.
The proof is available upon request.
Another advantage of the forgetting operator, important for our
purposes, is that updating can be expressed directly in terms of a
learning rate. Usually, with Bayesian updating, learning rates are
only implicit (because the Bayes transformation is generally non-
linear). We shall use the symbol gl(T) for the learning rate for
option l in trial T.
Specifically, with the forgetting algorithm, the posterior mean
probability vector is computed as follows:
^ p plT~
Nl(T)b cl cl(T)zn0 ^ p p0
Nl(T)zn0
,
where Nl(T), the effective number of observations used to update
beliefs for location l, equals
Nl
l(T)~1zl(T)Nl
l (T{1),
if location l was chosen in trial T, and otherwise:
Nl
l(T)~l(T)Nl
l(T{1);
and where b cl cl(T) is a sufficient statistic based on past observed
outcomes for location l, and updated as follows:
b cli cli(T)~b cli cli(T{1) 1{gl(T) ðÞ zgl(T)cliT
if option l was chosen in trial T, and
b cli cli(T)~b cli cli(T{1)
if not.
The learning rate gl(T) determines the weight on the most
recent observation in the updating equation for the sufficient
statistic b cl cl(T). It is defined, recursively, as follows: if location l is
chosen in trial T, then
gl(T)~
1
1z l(T)
gl(T{1)
,
otherwise
gl(T)~
gl(T{1)
l(T)
:
One can express the learning rate non-recursively:
gl(T)~
X
t[Dl(T)
P
T
s~t
l(s)
   2
4
3
5
{1
,
where the set Dl(T) contains the trials up to T when location l was
visited.
Model-Free Reinforcement Learning
For model-free reinforcement learning, we applied a simple
Rescorla-Wagner rule. Let Q(l,T) denote the value of option l
after the outcome in trial T.
N If l is sampled at trial T,
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ð7Þ
where d(T)~rlT{Q(l,T{1) is the prediction error (outcome
rlT minus prediction).
N If l is not sampled at trial T, then Q(l,T)~Q(l,T{1).
Here, the learning rate is fixed but color-specific. As such, the
reinforcement learning model allows for adjustment of the learning
rate to the average level of unexpected uncertainty (red options
jump more often than blue ones), in line with evidence that the
learning rate increaseswith average unexpected uncertainty[4].We
also tested model-free reinforcement learning with a single learning
rate across choices. The fit was worse, even after penalizing the
model with dual learning rates for the extra degree of freedom.
We also fit a modified reinforcement learning model, where the
learning rate adjusts to the size of the prediction error in the last
trial. This is the Pearce-Hall model [8].
Computation of Unexpected Uncertainty in the Bayesian
Model
The computations, which are provided in [9], and available in
Text S1. We repeat the key arguments here, for ease of reference. At
each trial, the Bayesian decision maker needs to infer whether a jump
has occurred. Since jumps are color-dependent only, the Bayesian
model extrapolates such inference to all options with the same color
as the chosen one. As before, l(T) denotes the probability that no
jump has occurred. l(T) is color-specific and we shall write lblue(T)
for the blue options and lred(T) for the red ones. Without loss of
generality,take l, the visited location at trial T,t ob ere d .(I nt h ema i n
text, and earlier in the Methods Section, we dropped the color
reference, to avoid unnecessary notational burden.) Formally,
l(T)red~P(JredT~0jclT):
The computation of this subjective probability leads to
lred(T)~
1
1z
^ p pi 0(nlT{1z1)
1znlT{1^ p pi lT{1
,
where i  refers to the realized component of the count vector at time
T{1. (For example, suppose that location l delivered the loss
outcome at trial T{1;t h e nclT{1~(1,0,0),a n di  is equal to 1.)
Thus, lred(T) depends on ^ p pi 0
^ p pi lT{1
,t h estrength of evidence for the
hypothesis that a jump has occurred at time T.
Unexpected uncertainty, the chance that a jump has occurred,
is complementary to the chance that no jump has occurred. At the
red location, it equals 1{lred(T). Therefore, lred(T) tracks
unexpected uncertainty at the red location.
Computation of Estimation Uncertainty in the Bayesian
Model
Estimation uncertainty is the dispersion of the posterior
distribution of outcome probabilities. It can be measured either
by the variance or the entropy.
The variance metric for option l at trial T is computed as follows:
vlT~
X 3
i~1
^ p pilTvilT~
X 3
i~1
^ p pilT
^ p pilT 1{^ p pilT ðÞ
nlTz1
:
From [47], we define the entropy of the posterior probability
distribution for option l at T as follows:
elT:e PlT ðÞ ~{EPT ln
PlT
P0
  
~{
ð
H
PlT(p)ln
PlT(p)
P0(p)
  
dp:
The entropy metric is thus
elT~ln
P3
i~1C(nlT^ p pilT)C(n0)
C(n0=3)
3C(nlT)
 !
{
X 3
i~1
(nlT^ p pilT{n0=3) F(nlT^ p pilT){F(nlT) ðÞ ,
where F(x)~LlnC(x)
Lx is the Digamma function.
Choice Model
We used the softmax function to transform valuations for the
options into choice probabilities. It generated a probability
distribution Pp(l,Tz1) that location l would be visited in the
subsequent trial Tz1. In the base version, valuations remained
unadjusted, namely, the expected payoff in the next trial Q(l,T).
The softmax function depended on one parameter, namely, the
inverse temperature b. See Eqn. 5.
A couple of alternative versions were considered, by taking the
average of the expected payoff and a bonus or (if negative) a
penalty. The bonus/penalty was equal to the level of parameter
estimation uncertainty (variance or entropy of the posterior
distribution as defined above). In the model with bonus, Q(l,T)
in Eqn. 5 was replaced with either vQ(l,T)z(1{v)vlT (when
measuring estimation uncertainty with the variance metric) or
vQ(l,T)z(1{v)elT (when using the entropy metric). In the
model with penalty, it was replaced with vQ(l,T){(1{v)vlT or
vQ(l,T){(1{v)elT. Without loss the parameter v can be set
equal to 1/2. This particular value is not pivotal in the sense that
replacing it with 1=4 or 3=4 does not change the main results
qualitatively (i.e., whatever the value of the parameter, the version
with penalty significantly improved the fit of the base model, and
the version with bonus did not).
Model Fitting
Using participant choices, we fitted the free parameters of each
model: b for the Bayesian and Pearce-Hall learning models; b,
gblue and gred for the reinforcement learning model. For each
participant, best fit was obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood
LL compounded over trials:
LLs~
X Ts
t~1
lnPp(lst   ,t), ð8Þ
where lst  is the option chosen by subject s in trial t, and Ts is the
number of trials participant s played.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Graphical display of the individual (negative) log-
likelihoods of the Bayesian models, with penalty for ambiguity (Y-
axis) and without (X-axis).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.s001 (0.01 MB PDF)
Figure S2 Graphical display of the individual (negative) log-
likelihoods of the models in Treatment 3.
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Figure S3 Graphical display of the individual (negative) log-
likelihoods of the models in Treatment 1.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.s003 (0.02 MB PDF)
Figure S4 Graphical display of the individual (negative) log-
likelihoods of the models in Treatment 2.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.s004 (0.02 MB PDF)
Text S1 Supplemental material.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001048.s005 (0.20 MB PDF)
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